By Jim Jubak
The financial crisis is looking less, well, crisislike.
Global financial markets aren’t out of the woods by any means, but each day we seem to inch a little further from the brink.
For example, the commercial paper market, the market for short-term debt that global businesses use to finance their day-to-day operations, has started to function again. The amount of commercial paper issued and sold to investors by companies jumped 46% on Oct. 27 from the amount issued Oct. 25. The worry not so long ago was that this market would freeze up completely, leaving companies unable to finance their basic operations.
Take a quick, short breath of relief. And then start worrying about the real economy. Every day the signs — such as the 159,000 jobs lost in September and the Oct. 30 report of a 0.3% drop in U.S. gross domestic product in the third quarter — are clearer that the United States, along with Japan and Europe, is almost certain to slip into a recession by the end of 2008.
And, unfortunately, it’s not going to be your normal recession. It will last longer than usual. It’s likely to be resistant to the traditional medicines of interest-rate cuts and increased government spending. And the recovery, when it comes, is likely to be less than robust. Some might call it anemic.
After the flood
Let me tell you why I think we’re looking at something other than a normal recession and what that means for investors.
Recessions are a normal part of the capitalist business cycle. Recessions wash out excesses in the system by shaking out inefficient companies, thus clearing the way for new competitors, and they work to keep supply and demand in sync over the long term.
In the past 50 years, we’ve had recessions (or recessionlike economic downturns) in 1969-70, 1973-75, 1980-82, 1990-91 and 2001.
Some of these have been relatively mild: The 2001 recession saw three quarters of negative growth, but the economy contracted by just 0.6%, 1.6% and 0.3% in those quarters. Some have been much more painful: In the second and fourth quarters of 1981 and in the first quarter of 1982, the economy contracted by 2.8%, 4.6% and 6.5%, respectively. Some downturns are extremely brief: The recessions of 1990-91 and 2001 lasted for just three quarters each. Some go on and on: The downturn that began in the second quarter of 1980, when the economy contracted by 7.9%, didn’t fully release its grip on the U.S. economy until the fourth quarter of 1982, 10 quarters later.
There’s bad news in those numbers. The evidence says recessions will be longer than average if they follow a financial crisis, especially if that financial crisis was caused by efforts to keep the economy humming by flooding the market with cheap capital.
Unfortunately, that’s a very good description of where the U.S. economy stands right now.
The pin that popped the bubble and set loose the current financial crisis was the collapse of inflated housing prices. Those high prices led people to take out mortgages they couldn’t afford from banks that should have known the money wouldn’t be repaid.
But homebuyers and mortgage lenders were by no means alone in their love of cheap money. We’re now suffering through the reaction to a global three-ring circus of leverage. Hedge funds, private-equity investors and even banks borrowed directly in Japan, the U.S. or wherever money was cheap in order to buy more debt, stocks, real estate and commodities than they could have bought with their own money. Pension funds, insurance companies, company chief financial officers and money market funds borrowed money indirectly by buying derivatives created with that borrowed money.
Why not increase your buying power by borrowing 30 times your actual capital, as Lehman Bros. (LEHMQ, news, msgs) did before its collapse, when you could borrow at an interest rate below the inflation rate, thus ensuring that, in real terms, you paid back less than you borrowed? After all, the bull market, fueled by this borrowing, virtually guaranteed a profit.
When the assets — starting with real estate and gradually expanding to take in stocks, commodities, corporate loans, commercial paper and the derivatives based on them — that were the foundation of this mountain of leverage fell in price, all that borrowing had to be unwound, as creditors demanded more collateral on loans and borrowers rushed to sell before asset prices fell further and creditors demanded even more collateral.
That fear, compounded by uncertainty about what anything that had been purchased with borrowed money was really worth, drove financial institutions such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Bros. and Washington Mutual (WAMUQ, news, msgs) to — and then over — the edge of insolvency. And it created a credit crunch as even the lenders with money decided it was better to sit on the cash rather than make a loan that might not be repaid.
5 steps down
That global circus of leverage and the unwinding of that leverage — what we call the global financial crisis — has had five big impacts on the shape of the recession we now face:
It means this recession started in the corporate sector. Most recessions start with a decline in consumer demand that leads to cutbacks in production — and then in hiring, capital budgets and in day-to-day spending on everything from travel to staples — by companies across the economy.
But the credit crunch caused by the global financial crisis led companies to make spending cuts even before consumer demand fell significantly. Companies began cutting spending on new plants and production, on hiring, on travel, on office supplies, on benefits and more in an effort to save cash because it was difficult or impossible to raise cash in the public debt markets.
It means that when the recession finally did reach the consumer sector, the drop-off in consumer buying was steep. Take a look at the auto industry. U.S. auto sales hit a record 17.4 million units in 2000 and then stayed above 17.1 million units in 2001. What’s extraordinary is how little sales fell over the next five years: In 2005 sales were still at 16.9 million units, and in 2006 they dipped just a bit, to 16.6 million. Even in 2007, when the financial crisis and the mortgage meltdown started to hit, sales just fell to 16.1 million units.
Why did sales stay so close to record levels so long? Cheap money. When consumer demand gave any hint of flagging, car companies borrowed at low interest rates to offer car buyers 0% financing and cash rebates in the thousands of dollars. At the same time, they used cheap money to finance the shift of millions of car buyers from car loans to car leases, which reduced the monthly payments on buying a new car. Stretching out car loans from three years to four and then to five also reduced the monthly payments.
When the financial crisis finally forced the automakers to cut back on these incentives, auto sales dropped off a cliff. Sales in September ran at an annual rate of 12.5 million. That’s a drop of 22% from the 2007 rate.
Going forward, I suspect it will take extra time to get auto sales in the U.S. back up to the 2007 or 2006 levels because some percentage of sales during those years were essentially borrowed from 2008 and beyond. Cheap money in the form of cash rebates, leases and low loan rates moved some percentage of sales forward as people who might have “naturally” bought in 2008 were persuaded to buy in 2007.
I think we can expect the same effect in the housing, computer, cell phone and other industries in which cheap financing kept demand from falling by borrowing from future sales.
It means consumer demand will show a protracted, two-stage decline. I’d call what I described in No. 2 above the first stage of consumer decline. It’s a version of the typical drop in consumer demand we see in a recession, although its arrival was delayed by the global abundance of cheap money. It finally arrived when the deleveraging of the global financial system reduced or, in some cases, eliminated the supply of cheap money that companies could use to keep consumers buying.
But the credit crunch has a direct effect on consumer buying, too. In this stage, the drying up of consumers’ access to credit creates a second drop-off in consumer buying. This consumer credit crunch is about to kick in now that credit card companies are reducing the amount of credit they offer their customers and making that credit more expensive. American Express (AXP, news, msgs), for example, has said it will increase interest rates by 2 or 3 percentage points for some of its cardholders and reduce credit limits on some of its business and personal cards. Another big card issuer, Capital One Financial (COF, news, msgs), has reduced customer credit lines, on average, by 4.5% in the second quarter.
The moves by the card companies aren’t surprising; the companies wrote off $21 billion in bad credit card debt in the first half of 2008. Losses in the first half of the year came to 5.5% of credit card debt outstanding and could climb to as much as 7.9% before this recession is over. And while it’s not surprising that credit card companies are tightening the debt spigot, it’s sure bad news for a U.S. consumer economy that runs on debt.
It will mean we’re likely to see a second drop in corporate spending in response to the delayed decline in consumer spending. That will stretch out the recession. Once consumers slow their spending, companies will launch a second round of cuts of the sort typical in normal recessions.
At this point companies will take the same steps to reduce production that they take in any recession. These cutbacks are just now becoming visible in the economy.
It will mean ending this recession will be tougher than usual. The standard medicine for a recession is more government spending on infrastructure (roads and bridges), an extension of unemployment benefits to prop up demand (and relieve suffering), grants to cities and states so they can keep spending and not add to the recession with their own set of cutbacks, and interest-rate cuts.
Those fiscal moves are exactly the package of fixes that the Democrats in Congress have proposed for a second stimulus package. I think that kind of plan would indeed be good news for infrastructure companies and local governments, and could well reduce how far the economy will fall in this recession.
However, the amount of money Congress is talking about — and the amount in the first stimulus package (remember those checks that some of us got?) — is small compared with the amount that the credit crunch has taken out of consumer buying power. Add to that the flip side of the wealth effect — people spend less when their houses and stock portfolios are worth less — and you can see why this recession is a lot more likely to look like the long recessions of 1973-75 and 1980-82 than the blink-and-they’re-over recessions of 1990-91 and 2001.
As for interest-rate cuts, the Federal Reserve has already cut the federal funds rate to 1%. However, with the financial markets recovering but still ruled by fear, low rates from the Fed are largely irrelevant.
What should investors do about a protracted U.S. recession? I’ve got three suggestions. I’ll mention them briefly here and then spell them out in more length in future columns.
3 steps forward
First, if everybody and his uncle are going to spend on infrastructure to fix this crisis, go long infrastructure.
China is going to spend $300 billion on its railroads as one way to get its economy at full speed again. Even if this kind of infrastructure spending in China, the U.S. and elsewhere isn’t going to work well as a recession fix, it still should benefit the income statements of the infrastructure companies involved.
Second, go overseas. Especially go overseas to emerging markets. Emerging economies were growing faster than the mature economies of the U.S., Europe and Japan before this crisis, and they’ll grow faster than the developed world after this crisis is over.
JPMorgan Chase (JPM, news, msgs) now expects the U.S. economy to shrink 4% and the euro economies to shrink 2% in the fourth quarter of 2008. In 2009, it forecasts 0.4% global economic growth, with developed economies shrinking 0.5% and emerging economies growing 4.2%. It stands to reason that the consumers most optimistic about being out of a recession in 12 months live in China, Vietnam and Russia, according to recent surveys.
Third, if the U.S. recession is going to be a long one, value investors looking for bargains in the U.S. stock market should look for bargains that pay dividends. That way they’ll get paid while they wait for the market to catch up with their valuations on these shares.
Warren Buffett has done exactly that in recent deals to buy shares of General Electric (GE, news, msgs) and Goldman Sachs Group (GS, news, msgs). Those have come with 10% dividends. You can’t do quite as well as Buffett, but there are value stock bargains out there paying 4% or 5%. Not bad when a 5-year U.S. Treasury note was yielding just 2.71% as of Oct. 29.
In my next column, I’m going to take a look at China’s efforts to end its recession — if you can call the possibility of 7% growth in 2009 a recession — before it starts. I’ll get to the other topics, I promise.
Developments on past columns
“Your guide to the next 12 months”: Oneok Partners (OKS, news, msgs) has rallied past my $52-a-share target price. But I’m not going to sell quite yet.
Shares of the high-yield gas pipeline master limited partnership have rallied strongly on the Federal Reserve’s interest-rate cut. When the Fed lowered its benchmark rate by half a percentage point to 1%, everything with a yield above that rate became more valuable. Odds are, this wasn’t the Fed’s last cut, so I think investors are likely to see even more appreciation in these shares.
And the price is likely to get a boost when the partnership reports third-quarter earnings Nov. 5. Look for news of increased revenue from the start of operations in the third quarter of the Overland Pass pipeline. As of Oct. 31, I’m raising my target price for Oneok Partners to $58 a share by June 2009 from the prior target of $52 by December 2009. (Full disclosure: I own shares of Oneok Partners in my personal portfolio.)
“Be ready for the commodity comeback”: Production from the world’s existing oil fields is falling faster than was projected just last year. A new report from the International Energy Agency says outputs from currently producing oil fields is falling 9.1% a year. For example, production from the United Kingdom’s share of the North Sea oil fields will fall to 500,000 barrels a day by 2030 from 1.7 million barrels a day today.
The solution, according to the agency, is increased investment in existing fields to slow the decline and increased investment in unconventional sources of oil such as the heavy sands of Canada or the extra-heavy oil of Venezuela. To keep oil production ahead of demand, the world will have to invest $360 billion a year every year until 2030. Oil service stocks, anyone?
“Cheap stocks? They’re an illusion”: Wall Street analysts are still playing catch-up with a slowing U.S. economy. As of Oct. 29, the day before the U.S. government announced that the nation’s economy had contracted 0.3% in the third quarter of 2008, Wall Street was projecting that earnings on the stocks in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index ($INX) would fall 6% in 2008 from 2007 and then show a 16.9% increase for 2009. Citigroup (C, news, msgs), which came out with its own forecast that day, is projecting a 12.4% decline in 2008 earnings and a 13.5% drop in 2009.
Keep that in mind when you start thinking stocks are cheap based on trailing earnings for the past 12 months or on projected 2009 earnings per share. Seems like projected earnings have a ways to go to catch up with economic reality.